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33
eign markets for U.S. firms and our clients. This pact will result
in benefits to consumers and businesses in both countries, as well
as globally. We look forward to continue to work with both this
committee and the Administration in developing a fair, rules-based
trading system that enhances U.S. economic competitiveness.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Marc E. Lackritz can be found on
page 161 in the appendix.]
Mr. FEENEY. Thank you.
Mr. Tarullo, please pull that mike close to you so we can hear
you.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. TARULLO, PROFESSOR,
GEORGETOWN UNlVERSITYIAW CENTER

Mr. TARULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am struck by the fact that it is Chile and Singapore we are talking about here. Chile and Singapore have been
among the most exemplary developing countries in terms of their
economic policies, their financial policies, and the orthodoxy of
those policies. The fact that both of those countries, neither of
which have imposed capital controls on out-flows in recent decades,
asked that they be allowed to retain some capacity to impose capital controls in exigent circumstances seems to me a reason why
this committee and the Congress ought to take a moment and reflect upon the import of these capital control provisions as a template for future agreements.
Now, why would Chile and Singapore, as I say, two orthodox exemplary sets of macroeconomic policymakers ask for an exception?
I think it is because of the cumulative effect of not just the Asia
crisis, but the Mexico crisis, and what they have observed over the
last decade in an increasingly globalized and sometimes turbulent
financial system. They want to retain the capacity, in an emergency, to do something that they otherwise have no intention of
doing. The International Monetary Fund, which was certainly a
proponent of full capital account liberalization as recently as seven
or eight years ago, has just released a very careful study which
shows how nuanced one has to be in determining when and how
capital flows are going to be efficient and effective in developing
economies.
Why is it that capital flows do not have the effect in a developing
economy that they do in the United States, where more or less
untrammeled capital flows are indeed productive? I think it is because we are in that murky realm which economists call the world
of second-best. Developing countries do not have deep and liquid
capital markets, by and large. They do not have well regulated securities markets. They do not, by and large, have sophisticated supervision for their banking systems. For all of these reasons, the
countries are not able to absorb capital flows, particularly shorter
term debt flows, in the way that the United States or the United
Kingdom could. That is the reason why Cuile and Sinttapore want
this insurance policy, and that is the reason why I think we need
to pay heed to their policymakers, speaking for themselves and on
behalf of other developing countries.
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What troubles me about the present template is that it is really
quite absolutist. It really does not distinguish, as Dr. Henry is trying to do, among different kinds of capital flows. Indeed, I note that
the investment chapter of the Singapore agreement mentions and
includes as an "investment" bonds, debentures, other debt instruments and loans. Unlike the NAFI'A, for example, it does not say
such bonds, debentures, debt instruments and loans of longer than
three years duration. It is any such bond, debenture, debt instrument or loan. That kind of painting with a broad brur:h seems to
me not to incorporate the appropriate modesty that we all must
have in assessing the operation of global financial systems in developing countries in the wake of all we have seen in the last decade.
I am concerned that what we are witnessing here is a bit of a
triumph of economic creed over economic evidence. What I wou!d
like to see is more of what Dr. Henry and others are doing, of trying to draw distinctions, to see how much we can learn, and then
through appropriate channels such as the IMF and discussions in
the G-7, to see if we can come up with a set of sensible nuanced
standards-standards that are not just based upon the textbook finance that apply in the United States, but that are based on the
real operation of capital markefS in the murky second-best world
of developing countries.
I do absolutely believe that when the United States enters into
trade agreements, it ought to be doing so with its self-interest in
mind. But that self-interest needs to be an enlightened self-interest. By "enlightened" I mean that we promote rules which are
going to redound to the benefit of all of our trading partners, which
will produce a more growth-oriented, stable international economy
in which the exports of the members of the coalitions represented
by the gentlemen on my flanks today will be able to prosper. I do
not think we have an interest in some sort of short-term asset
grab, if it is at the cost of our ability to promote such sensible
rules.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Daniel K. Tarullo can be found on
page 177 in the appendix.]
Mr. FEENEY. Thank you._
Mr. Vastine?
STATEMENT OF J. ROBERT VASTINE, PRESIDENT, COALITION
OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES
Mr. VASTINE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am here
to testify on the commercial advantages of the Singapore and Chile
agreements, and explain why they should be approved bY,the Congress.
U.S. financial services companies are committed to trade negotiations to remove barriers to trade and investment. In any form,
these barriers are very extensive. We would be glad to supplr lists
by countries of the kinds of barriers our companies face. The mdustry's $6.3 billion trade balance in cross-border trade in financial
services last year would grow if we could remove these barriers. Indeed, reducing barriers to U.S. services trade is our best hope to
reduce the chronic goods trade deficit that Congressman Sanders
has referred to.
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SUBSCOMMI'M'EE ON DOMESTIC ANDJNTERNATIONAL
MONETARY POLICY, TRADE AND tECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPR.f.SENTATIVES
Ap.r!I},1003
I

Thank you vecy much for your Invitation to testifY todlY. I am cWTCntly a professor
at Oeorgetown University Law Center. Between J993 and J998 I held several economic
policy POIItIOIU in the United States Oovernment, endln, u Auiltant to the President for
International Economic Policy. IleStifY today purely in my individual capacity as an
academic, with no client interelts or representation.
Let me uy at the outlCt that I tupport the ncgotiltion of bit.lenI free trade

agroemen" witb Chile and Singllpore. llolh have bipani5lin origlnl and bipartillln support.

Let me .110 Illy at the IIUltet Ihllt I do nllt come befolc the Subcommittee 11$ an advocate of
t.tpllAloollllOl •. J do Wille: 10 c.ltiti/.c Ihe indu,I,," In Ihclte two Prol)(Jitd lrade ISlllefncul
or fulOl,tmaliling Cllle."I"" IIIl,IIn ~"lIIlIlc. IlIr C:lllployi"j& rc.I,h;Uuo' em CAp".1 nowi.

1,,..1 II,.llIlllll'lIl1l)'. t. .. IIIIlllfllltllh Y• • 1141111,,' '1IIf'IK" IM,IiIY·

''''IHIII.1I1

II, ,If''''' It" ,I,,, ".". h' ,~, ." I" ".1 ..." ""'IIII.'.,1t
f

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

f't

,I. . y ,·vI<I""III.,.

178
compromiS«i, but I doubt their views have chaliged. Of course, the Administration was
attempting in these negotiations to create a "template" (or future negotiations, importantly
including the proposed regional trade agreements in this hemisphere. Thus I believe the
Congress should send a strong message to the Administration: Such provisions are
inappropriate in any agreement and may do substantial harm to both U.S. and emerging
market interests in agreements with countries that arc nOI as financially sophisticated as
Singapore or Chile.

TIt. Tenuous Case/or International FinllncJllllnugrlltWn
The Administration has publicly defended its position in the Singapore and Chile
negotiations by asserting the benefits of liberalized capital flows. It has invoked wellknown lheoretical arguments such as the increased mobilization of capital that occurs from
the deepening of capital markets and the economic stabilization that comes from more
efficient risk-spreading. These are appealing arguments and, in the context of a deep and
well-regulated capital market such as the United States, convincing as well. The problem,
thouSh, i, that in the wnlext o( developing conntries, the evidence that these salutary
effect~ (.ceUI i~ rl(

from well-established.

Jult a few w«kI 1110, the International Monetary Fund published an extensive review

of Iht OOOfIOmic Illerature on I~ effeclS of financial globaliulion on developing countries.

'I he 'tudy wu flulncoo, and ils author, WCfe careful not to jump 10 conclusion, on the
h,,11 of thoir policy prroilrxultions. On the emlra! point, though, the study'S ooncluJion
w ... UlleljUIVIJClI. A relr-minded rc:viewer of the

exilting evidence limply cannot assert

11i~1 alolllil (llIlnda' Inttllfllion PWIIIOIU N'ltllilklnl

2

ewnomic IVI,wth in developing
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countries. The fact that the International Monetary Fund was the source of this paper
mates this cont'tusion even more significant It was not so long ago that the Fwd was
preaching t'Je virtues of more or less complete capital account liberalization for everyone.
The financial crises of the 1990s led many at the Fund to reexamine its policies and the
premises on which those policies were based.
Note that this conclusion contrasts markedlywith the overwhelming, thougb not
unanimous, conclusion of empiricalltUdies that trade integration does help to promote
economic growth in developing countries; It is also important to note some potential
explanations for why financial integration docs not have a similar, demonstrable effect
Most of these explanations revolve around the relatively undeveloped character of legal
and market institutions in emerging markets. That is, financial integratlrm and increased

capital flows may yield the hoped-for economic benefits only where the capital can be
channeled efficiently within a developing country. Forcing capital in before the necessary
institutions are in place may, the evidence suggests, have little positive effect on overall
growth prospects.
We are, in other words, in that murky world of second best. The theoretical
advantages of unregulated capital flows appear to be realized only where other important
conditions obtain. Where they do not - as is often the case in most emerging markets - the
benefits may simply not be forthcoming. Surely most countries will want to develop
financial markets that will eventually allow them to realize the benefits of unimpeded
capital flows more readily observed in highly developed finMCiai markets. But the
sequencing of steps that will most readily achieve this desirable end is tir from c1esr.

3
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As the recent IMF study and other reviews make clear, the ambiguity and
inconclusiveness of tile present evidence does not mean that the case will never be made
for the growth-albancing character offrec capital flows. Indeed, there is already. much
stronger body of evidence for the benefits of foreign direct investment (15 opposed to
portfolio investments such IS stocks and bonds) for economic growth. And there have been
a few studies purporting to find a positive correlation between financial integration and
growth. But most do not At this juncture. at least, an assertion that global financial
integration promotes economic development for most emerging market countries must be
attributed more to economic creed than to economic evidence.

TI" p()tMtiJzI/Ol' EctJ"omic Disruption

If the positive economic case for requiring full capital liberalization CIMOt be
established, perhaps the Administration's position can be justified on the ground that
capital flows have at worst a neutral effect. and may sometimes have significant positive
effects. Unfortunately for this possible justification, there is evidence that the liberalization
of capital flows can make developing countries more vulnerable to financial crises. Again.
the reason Is not that capital flows arc bad in principle. Sometimes, though, developing
countries are not able to absorb increased flows in their relatively embryonic banking
systems and capital markets in a manner consistent with sound credit standards.
Moreover, sudden inflows of capital can be used to finance consumption. But - and thls Is
the most important point - the spigot can be, and is, turned off 15 quicldy as it is turned on.
Capital from the advanced industrial countries often flows into emerging markets in
search of higher returns during periods oflow interest rates at horne, or following .. sudden

4
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spurt in an emerging market's rate of growth. But it will cease flowing as soon as signs of
a slowdown or banking problemt emerge, or as investment opportunities at home become

more attractive. Indeed, knowing that the markets of many developing countries are
relatively illiquid, investors may quite understandably be quicker to withdraw their
investments from a developing country marleet than they would disinvest from a developed
financial market. Herd behavior is a very real phenomenon, and one that is not irrational
from the standpoint of the investor.

As foreign short·term capital is withdrawn from the developing country. its curreocy
can depreciate rapidly, leading in tum to more capital flight. Meanwhile, import prices

soar, hll'!Ding the country's economy. Once the crisis hits, the developing country has no
good options. Raising interest rates dramatically may stem the outflow of funds, but at the

cost of a serious recession. Borrowing mODey from the IMF can help reassure investors
that they will be repaid. But IMP paclcages are rarely big enough to cover all obligalioDS

and. of course, they increase the debt of the affected country.
In such circumstances, the imposition of capital controls may be a viable tool to belp

stabili7.e a country's currency and give its government some breathing space for financial
reform. This was the approach taken, with apparent success, by Malaysia during the 199798 global financial crills. Altl!malively, the country mlY design and implement a systerD
of capital restrictions to forestall sudden inflows or outflows. This was the approach taken
by Chile itself during the J9905. There is disagreement among economists as to the
relative importance and effectivCllcss of ChIle', capital control. compared to its other
economic policiea. There can be little doubt, however, that Chilean officials believed they

5
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were taJdng prudent, limited steps within the context of very sound macroeconomic
policies.
Capit;l controls can be - and often are - iJI-conccived, poorly implemented, or both.
Even effective capital controls would not be costless. Some useful investments would be
prevented or discouraged. There may be opportunities for political favoritism end
corruption in the administration of the controls. Perhaps even more serious in the longer
run, capital controls may be used as a means to avoid refonn, rather than to provide
breathing space within which to implement reforms. Like all policy instruments. the costs
of proceeding must be mClSW'ed against the benefits and against alternative policy
approaches. This calculus wili. by definition, vary from case to case. Yet the
Administration's negotiating position in the Chile and Singapore taIb was that capital
controls are always bad and should be prohibited by the rules of a bilateral trade agreement
Indeed, Administration officials have publicly staled this view in on-the-record comments.
The Administration is repeating the mistalce which the IMF itself made a decade ago.
At that time there was substantial enthusiasm within the Fund for making full capital
account liberalization mandatory for all Fund members. This enthusiasm was based on the
same theoretical advantages clfed today by the Administration. Appropriately, perhaps. the
. financial crisis broke out in Asia just as the campaign for full capital account liberalization

was beins accelerated. Fund staff, developing country officials. academic economists and
others all recognized fairly quickly that large, short-term capital flows can sometimes have
deleterious effects In relatively undeveloped capital marleets. They further recognized that
these effectJ will be exacerbated in countries pursuing ill-advised macroeconomic policies.

But requiring full capital liberalization would not then, and will not today, magically make
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developill8 country capital markets more liquid

or bank regulation more effective or

maaoeconomic policies more sustainable.
We do nollive in a textbook world, but In that complicated second·best world I
meutioned earlier, where theoretically beneficial policies may at times do more hann than
good. Remembec, too, that the textbooks themselves must be rewritten after each major

financial crisis, which results from a different set of proximaIe causes and unfolds in a
different way. The prominence of privately held debt in precipitating the crisis that began
in Asia in 1997 surprised nearly all government officials, market actors, and academics,
who had become accustomed to focusing on the sovereign debt and balance of payments
positions of developing countries. I suspect that the origins of the next widespread crisis
will also surprise us, even though we will see in retrospect some of the same
vulnerabilities. One can understand. in such a world. the nervousness of even the most
orthodox developing connlly officials. One would also think that this is an occasion for
modesty about our understanding of the effects of capital flows in particular circumstances.
The desitable aims oftbe United Stales related to developing counlly capital flows

and policies are, in my view, fairly clear: We should continue to encourage official and
academic research inlo the effects of capital flow and capital controls in developing
countries, so !hat empirical work can provide a solid basis for policy. We should, thougb
multilateral financial Institutions such u the IMF, encourage the adoption of sound
economic policies and usist the Improvement of banking and capital market regulation In
developing countries, so that they Wl11 be able to gain the benefits ofliberalizcd capital
floWi without undue rillt of financial crisis. We should, both directly and through our
participation in the IMP, warn countries away from reliance on capital controls u a
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- substitute for polqrefonn and.the strengtbeniDg ofmarlcc:t and regulatory institutions.. _

But we should not attempt to impose a policy that penalizes an emerging marlcct country
beset by financial contagion that adopts temporary capital controls in accordance with the
best judgment ofils own financial officials following consultatioll$ with the IMF.

The IIIjlrlllhies oltlle Nqotillted Provisimts
As has been well reported in the press, the governments of both Chile and Singapore

resisted the Administrltion's demand ~ a rule in the trade agreements prohibiting the use

. of capital controls under any circumstances. Singaporean officials, for example, were
quoted as saying that Singapore needed to "retain flexibility in extreme cases" to use

controls. Again, we see this concern even on the part of an emerging nwket government
thai has followed orthodox macroeconomic policies and that did not institute contrc.:s
during the turbulence of 1997-98. The Administration refused to Igret to an exception
even for the most extn:me of crises. In the words of an Administration official. "The U.S.
view is. we're not going to sign on to the notion that capital controls are justified in any
circumstances."
The Administration accordingly shifted its strategy and sought the provisions that we
have in the texts of the agreements. These provisions provide for direct, automatic
compensation of U.S. investors by Chile or Singapore should one oftbose countries ever
impose capital controls of any sort. This "solution" compounds the Administration's
mistake on financial policy by distorting trade policy as well.
The eareements give any U.S. Investor the right to obtain ~on for any "lOIS

or damage" arising from the use of capi~ controls. If the control "substantially impedes"
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transfcn.liability begins to aocruc &om the moment of imposition. If the cxmtrolsdo not

substantially impede transfers, then damages begin to lCCTUe del' the controls have been in
place for a year.
Thus, for example, an investor enjoying the higher yields that come from assuming
the risk attendant to lending in an emerging market would presumably be able to claim
damages for the imposition of capital controls if exchange rates moved unfavorably during
the period of controls. This right exislS even if the IMF approves the control. In a sense,
then, the investor would be receiving a free insurance policy for its investment Believers
in the market-efficient internalization of costs by economlc actors might think instead that a
participant in a financial market should assume the cost of hedging against creditand
morket risk.

The investor would have a right to proceed under the so-called investor-slate dispute
settlement provisions of these agreements. This procedure in essence gives the investor a
direct cause of action before an international arbitral tribunal, the decision ofwhicb can be
enforced in directly in the domestic courts of the parties. Members of the Subcommittee
may recognize this dispute settlement process from the controversies surrounding Chapter
II of the North American Free Trade Agreanent The arbitral panels that decide such
cases have generaUy been composed of people with the kinds of backgrounds one finds
among traditional commercial arbitrators. They will not likely have macroeconomic
expertise. Indeed, by the terms of the agreements, it does not mattel' how good a reason the
coW\try had for imposing controls in the fJ1'St place.
Furthermore, the decision of the arbitral panel is final. It may not be appealed on its
merits and is subject only to the loosest of constraints by domestic courts for exceeding its

9
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jurisdiction. The first decade of experien;:e under Chapter 1I

~eals

that some arbitral

panels have not hesitated to take a very broad view of the obligations of the government in
question. Indeed, In response to some of these cases, Ambassador Zoellick and his
subordinates have appropriately begun tu narrow th,= language in some of the provisions
which arbitral panels have expansively interpreted. But the fact remains that the arbitral
panel continues to be, for III intents and purposes, the final decision-maker.
It is important to correct some misir"lpressions concerning the provisions we are

discussing today. A number of people with whom I have spoken recently, including some
from the financial services indust1y, have agreed that an absolute prohibition on capital
controls is ill-advised. But they are con~oled by what they believe to be mitigating features
of the agreements as negotiated. Undoubtedly, any qualification on an absolute prohibition
is an improvement on the Administration's negotiating position. But I fear that some
observers read too much into the qualifications we find in these agreements.
One mitigating feature mentioned is I letter from Under Secretary Taylor to

Singaporean monetary officials which is appended to the text oftbe investment chapter of
the U.S.-Singapore trade agreement. This letter provides, among other things, a gloss upon
the meaning of the "substantially impede" language explained earlier. It would be a
mistake for those favoring retention of sensible discretion by emerging mar\cet finance
officials to take much comfort from this letter. As a law professor, I must say that it is not
a model of clear drafting. It leaves ample room for investors' lawyers to argue for damages
in almost any imaginable case. Moreover, even were the language more clear, it is not
necessarily I practical limitation on the discretion of an arbitral panel to award damages.
To Sly in the ab5tract, IS the letter does, that damages must be proven and not speculative
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is not to Win that a decision-maker will take a witably skeptical view of damage claims.
The Subcommittee should be very clear that, once these agreements arc approved, the

arbitral process is largely autonomous from the govemmentJ themselves. Overreaching in
a particular case cannot easily be rorrec:ted.
A second key misimpression is that the agreements do not give Investors a right to
collect damages for capital controls that have been in effect for less than a year. Those
who believe that there is a role for capital controls, but only controls applied for a relatively
short period. would be reassured by such a limitation 01\ damagcs. Unfortunately, this is

not what the agreements say. The agreements do require an investor to walt one year
before filing an arbitral claim. However, this is not an exclusion for losses arguably
incurred during that year. The damages begin to accrue from the moment controls are
imposed. It is only the collection of those damages that is delayed. Because the
agreements provide for interest to be paid on awards to investors, the only relief this
provision gives the developing country is that it need not pay the compensation
immediately.
It is true that the agreements exclude recovery oflosses resulting controls that do not
"substantially impede" transfers. But this provision just returns us to the uncertalnty
surrounding the meaning of "substantially impede." The g10sscs in UDder Secretary
Taylor's letter and press comments by an Administration official suggest that any measures
of sufficient robustness to help an emttgil18 marlc:et though. financial aisis would, in the
Administration's view, "substantially impede" transfers and thus be subject to
compensation claims.
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Not only is the Administration's approach to capital controls bad financial policy and
bad trade policy. It is also bad foreign policy. J would certainly favor a provision that
guanntced U.S. investors no less favorable treatment than that granted investors from the

country imposing the capital controls or from third countries. American investors should
not be singled out for adverse treatment by host countries. But the provisions in the
agreements require what will likely be more favorable treatment for U.S. invcst'lrs than for
other investors. domestic or third country. If a country party to one of these agreements
imposes capital controls. il will have 10 compensate Amaican investors but not others.
Let us play out the consequences.. A developing country is faced with a severe

financial crisis. It seeks IMF assistance., raises intCTCSt rates. and imposes temporary
controls on portfolio capital flows. While the IMF assistance and the controls help to
stabilize the country's external financial position. they do not prevent a serious recession.
the usual outcome of emerging mme! financial crises. The country's gross domestic
product declines significantly. Unemployment and poverty rise. Unless the country is very

luclcy. these consequences will be felt for years rather than months.
Then. as the country struggles to emerge from its recession and to repay its debts
(many of which will have been deferred or rescheduled). U.S. investors file their claims for
compensation. And, of course. under the bilateral trade agreement they are entitled to that
compensation. Thus the still-suffering citizens of the country are treated to the prospect of
U.S. investors being made whole while everyone else bears losses from an economic
tltaslrOphe that has afflicted the entire nltion. Regardless of what one thinks on the merits
ofc.1pital controls, one would have to be naIve not to think that an anti-American baclc1ash

12

189
-

.. ---woUJa-result:Iilstead of the United States being perceived as providing leadership to help
the coW\try back on its feet, we will be perceived as grabbing everything we can while the
country is Oat on its back.
This approach is not only It odds with a sensible strategy to maintain the goodwill of
developing countries towards the United States. It is also at odds with efforts to develop ~
set of fair and efficient procedures for the resolution of sovereign debt,problems. The U.S.
Government would have no authority to defer or reject ~claims of investors. Our
govenunent would thus be unable to deOect the foreign policy problem of U.S. investors
suing in international arbitration while other investors are being asked to forbear while an
approach to a country's debt problems is fashioned.
There is a great irony hero: Under the version of sovereign debt reslnlcturing
procedures currently being advocated by the International Monetary Fund, sovereign
payments could be suspended for a time while debts are rescheduled or written down.
Many people - myself included - have some questions aoovt these proposals. But a
nwnber ofpcople who favor a less top heavy. more "market friendly" mechanism for
sovereign debt restructuring rely upon the possibility of a developing country being able to
impose temporary capital controls in truly extreme circumstances as part of their
justification for opposing a world bankruptcy court. That is, they believe that most of the
time a market-based restructuring negotiation would be adequate, but that on some
oocasions the imposition of capital controls by the developing country might be necessary
to allow the process to work smoothly. The Administration position on capital controls
would, if realized in other agreements, undermine the reserved authority of a developing
country that could allow a generally less intrusive framework for debt restructuring. It
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might, thereby. build support for a more activi;;t sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
that would override U.S. and other domestic legal processes.

Finally, there is another possible foreign policy consequence. As investors from other
countries realize that U.S. investors are given preferential treatment and insulated from
losses if capital controls are imposed, they will hive an incentive to channel their
investments through I U.S. intermediary which qualifies lIS I U.S. investor unckr the
agreements. After I time, the United States may, for these purposes, resemble an offshore
financial center that helps investors from other countries evade taxes or money laundering
regulations or regulatory requirements. A moment's thought IS to bow we in the United
States hive traditionally regarded such offshore centers will reinforce one's foreign policy
uneasiness at the prospect of these provisions being exercised.

Tire Problems wiIIr Templllln

As earlier noted, the Administration intends the provisions of the Chile and Singapore
agreements to be a "templale" for future bilateral £lid regional trade agreements. This
expectation raises two serious ooncems beyond the uncertainties and disadvantages J have
mentioned in the contexl of Chile and Singapore.
First, does this intention mean that the Administration will seek to force removal of

existillg restrictions on capital flows as it negotiates more trade agreements? That is, will il
seek to obtain the right for U.S. investors to obtain damages for effects from existing
restrictions. The stated, absolutist view oftbe Administration would suggest an answer in
the affirmative. As we know, Chile and Sing.pore do nol currently impose controls and
have no apparent preunt plans to do so. But not all of our potential trade agreement
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partners are similarly situated. To remove controls rapidly, end without proper- cultivation
of filWldal and regulatory systems, would be to fly in the ~ of something we sbo' dd
have by now leamed - that capital account liberaliution, desirable as it may be as an end
point, needs to be carefully sequenced with the development of appropriate legal,

coonornic, and marltet institutions to handle the resulting capital flows without undue risk
of financial crisis.
Second, if the United States continues to insist on similar provisions in its bilateral

and regional trade agreements, it will be affecting not just bilateral relations but
international financial policy as a whole. We will be subverting the authority and influence
of the International Monetary Fund in an area in which it shows appropriate nuance. We
will be imposing unilaterally our doctrinaire view offinancial policy. <nd, as illustrated

by my COIlUllmts concerning debt restructuring proposals, we will have undennincd
cooperative efforts to fashion a sensible set of crisis prevention and crisis response
measures.

Co,;cluslon

In closing. I went to reiterate that I am not offering a brief for capital controls in
general or, indeed, in any particular circumstances. I share with others the concern that this
tool often causes more problems than it solves. But existing empirical work does not allow
us to say in sweeping tenns that free capital flows are always good for development, or that
restrictions on capital are always a mistake for a developing country. Current knowledge
does not permit a broadbrush rule. Even when we learn more, il is possible that an
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inflexible rule ';ViII nevtt be justified. Instead, presumptions and standards may be the most
we can with confidence derive from experience.
The Chile and Singapore agreements do not take account of these subtleties. The
implications oftbe Administration's absolutist position for international financial policy
and U.S. foreign policy interests seem not to have been considered. The potential for
negative effects upon the interests of both the developing world and our own country will
only grow if such provisions proliferate. The Congress should serve notice to the
Administration that this is not a template which it wants to see adopted in future
agreements.
Thank you very much for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any questions

•

you might have.

16

